West Bromwich Albion and their corners

When 35.9% of your assists come from a set-play, and 21.8% of your chances from set-plays, it’s fair to say it’s something that’s being concentrated on and to no little effect. West Bromwich Albion are the set-play kings this season, both absolutely and relatively. The recent win at Arsenal, which put significant further pressure on Arsene Wenger, cementing West Brom and Tony Pulis’ reputation of maximising the attacking potential, or at least trying to, of set-plays in general and corners in particular.

Of 39 goals, they’ve scored 14 from a set-play, either directly (a header straight from a corner) or indirectly (converting a flick-on from a near-post header, say). Their 35.9% of goals from set-plays as a total of overall goals scored is a league high in the Premier League. Their 21.8% of chances created, including assists, from set-plays is also a league high.

Table showing % of assists from set-plays

Team	Goals	Assists at set-play	% assists s-p
West Bromwich Albion	39	14	35.9
Swansea City	36	9	25.0
Watford	33	8	24.2
West Ham United	40	8	20.0
Middlesbrough	20	4	20.0
Hull City	26	5	19.2
Bournemouth	42	8	19.0
Burnley	31	5	16.1
Leicester City	33	5	15.2
Crystal Palace	36	5	13.9
Stoke City	33	4	12.1
Liverpool	61	7	11.5
Manchester United	42	4	9.5
Tottenham Hotspur	55	5	9.1
Southampton	33	3	9.1
Chelsea	59	5	8.5
Everton	51	4	7.8
Manchester City	54	4	7.4
Arsenal	56	4	7.1
Sunderland	24	0	0.0

Table showing % of chances from set-plays

Team	Chances from set-plays	Chances created (including assists)	% chances set-plays
West Bromwich Albion	48	220	21.8
Crystal Palace	47	231	20.3
Stoke City	43	215	20.0
Watford	42	212	19.8
Swansea City	45	231	19.5
Hull City	40	206	19.4
Burnley	37	202	18.3
West Ham United	50	290	17.2
Leicester City	37	222	16.7
Sunderland	30	190	15.8
Everton	48	305	15.7
Bournemouth	35	256	13.7
Manchester City	46	342	13.5
Middlesbrough	23	180	12.8
Tottenham Hotspur	42	362	11.6
Chelsea	35	304	11.5
Liverpool	43	385	11.2
Southampton	31	303	10.2
Arsenal	27	307	8.8
Manchester United	29	357	8.1

How does Pulis’ team achieve such high numbers? West Brom’s overall ability to create chances is decidedly bottom third, 7^th lowest in the league to be precise. But they’ve created the second most chances from set-plays overall, joint with Everton and two behind West Ham United. But Everton have created 305 chances including assists overall and produced 51 goals; West Ham have only scored 40, one fewer than West Brom, but have created 70 chances more (which says a lot about West Ham’s chance conversion rate too, by the way – West Ham are actually good from set-plays, or were with Dimitri Payet there, and their 20% assist rate from set-plays isn’t shabby; it’s in open play where they underachieve).

Pulis is known as a pragmatist: he sets his teams up with a big, solid back four, two holding midfielders, and this season has used the superb Salomon Rondon as a physical centre-forward. Indeed, Rondon’s aerial threat is significant, even in open play. West Brom are a big side, capable in the air, and their scoring percentage of headed goals demonstrates this:

Team	Goals	Headed goals	% headed
West Bromwich Albion	39	14	35.9
Swansea City	36	11	30.6
Middlesbrough	20	6	30.0
Crystal Palace	36	10	27.8
West Ham United	40	11	27.5
Leicester City	33	8	24.2
Arsenal	56	13	23.2
Manchester United	42	9	21.4
Watford	33	7	21.2
Everton	51	10	19.6
Liverpool	61	10	16.4
Tottenham Hotspur	55	7	12.7
Stoke City	33	4	12.1
Bournemouth	42	5	11.9
Southampton	33	3	9.1
Chelsea	59	5	8.5
Hull City	26	2	7.7
Burnley	31	2	6.5
Manchester City	54	3	5.6
Sunderland	24	0	0.0

[Note – not all these headed goals are from set-plays, even though West Brom’s percentage is the same]

It’s no wonder that Pulis has not only capitalised on the opportunity set-plays afford to get the ball at head height, but also that this more organised, more coachable aspect of play is something that the arch-pragmatist looks to exploit. The movement around set-plays can be deliberate and organised in a way that is harder to do in open play; the defensive structure at set-plays can also be arranged to minimise chances to be attacked on the counter.

Of course, having big lads and lumping the ball at them isn’t enough to be especially productive at set-plays (which West Brom clearly are: their 14 assists contrasts with the league mean this season of 5.6). You must think about how best to exploit the chances to make the most of them. West Brom’s tally of corners, for example, is low, compared to the league. They’ve had 118, joint fourth lowest with Burnley; only Sunderland (106), Middlesbrough (108), and Watford (109) have had fewer. But West Brom’s accuracy is good. They benefit from some excellent set-play takers, including Nacer Chadli, Matt Phillips, and Chris Brunt. They put the clear majority of their corners directly into the box, the mixer, if you will, and have a good rate of accuracy. They’re not the most accurate, or with the greatest proportion directly into the box, but they’re up there for both. Already, then, they are upping their opportunities by sending the ball into the most dangerous area with accuracy.

Table showing % of corners into the box and % accuracy, ranked by accuracy

Team	Corners	Corners into box	Successful corners into box	% into box	% into box successful
Stoke City	138	127	52	92.0	40.9
Burnley	118	113	46	95.8	40.7
West Bromwich Albion	118	108	41	91.5	38.0
West Ham United	139	126	46	90.6	36.5
Swansea City	142	124	45	87.3	36.3
Hull City	130	122	44	93.8	36.1
Crystal Palace	145	134	48	92.4	35.8
Chelsea	155	105	37	67.7	35.2
Manchester City	200	150	52	75.0	34.7
Watford	109	93	30	85.3	32.3
Tottenham Hotspur	192	143	44	74.5	30.8
Everton	152	119	36	78.3	30.3
Sunderland	106	90	27	84.9	30.0
Middlesbrough	108	96	28	88.9	29.2
Southampton	136	124	33	91.2	26.6
Leicester City	138	102	27	73.9	26.5
Liverpool	207	161	41	77.8	25.5
Arsenal	153	118	30	77.1	25.4
Bournemouth	166	95	24	57.2	25.3
Manchester United	169	141	32	83.4	22.7

So how do West Brom do it, accuracy and directness aside? Below are the two corners scored against Arsenal. The Gunners’ first error was to mark in what appears to be a zonal fashion. In the first image, you can see a player standing on Petr Cech, and two more directly in front of the ‘keeper, being marked.

Rondon and Gareth McAuley then run away from goal as the in-swinging corner is launched towards the mouth of the Arsenal goal. Unmarked, Craig Dawson loiters on the edge of area and begins a run that curves slightly away from the near post.

Three West Brom players are now in the six yard area behind the front post, not including the late-running Dawson, peeling slightly away from the near post to occupy the two Arsenal markers and the Arsenal defender helping Cech. Rondon, who has ended up almost on the edge of the box away from the near post and McAuley, who jumps into a gaggle of Arsenal players who have been drawn towards the ball, have drawn the defence out towards the flight of the ball. This creates a corridor into which Dawson, who has still not been picked up, can run. An Arsenal player attempts to challenge him, but Dawson’s pace onto the ball means he has the jump, literally, on the near post defender. Goal West Brom.

The second corner is almost a replay. There is a defender who has eyes on Dawson, but he’s not marking him so much as waiting to track a potential run.

Again, the near post West Brom players run towards the in-swinging corner and four Arsenal defenders start to go with them. I’ve not added arrows this time because the movement is obvious and so like before.

Dawson rises and scores. There are four clustered Arsenal defenders who’ve followed the near post players, one of whom is the defender who was supposed to be tracking Dawson but got sucked towards the ball, and three more who seem caught in no-man’s land. Cech is essentially alone, surrounded by white and blue shirts – Dawson’s movement has caught the defence on the hop, and it’s been dragged away from the danger zone by the in-swinging corner and the near post movement. While Arsenal’s lack of adaptation to the first goal conceded is poor, West Brom’s pace and coordinated movement is too much for the Gunners.

This corner goal against Hull shows a similar pattern of movement.

Three clustered West Brom players head in different directions: one goes on a curving run, peeling away from the penalty spot; one runs directly towards the near post; and one peels away from the six-yard box, but then stops. Rondon has also run away from the near post to the edge of the box, as he did in the examples above.

Dawson (25) has not stopped on the edge of the six-yard box. Hull are doing a better job of man-marking, but Dawson’s space distracts the cluster of Hull players towards the near post. McAuley, the scorer (underlined in blue), can only be challenged from behind because the other markers are watching the dipping in-swinger and Dawson, and he gets the jump on over his marker and guides a header into the goal.

Three goals, all from in-swinging corners, all showing orchestrated movement away from the front post and one or a series of timed, patterned runs from deep. This is a recurrent style in West Brom’s corners, too. Yes, they have big players who are good in the air, but as the above images show, Pulis or his coaching team have created patterns that maximise the chances afforded by set-plays. The two near-post decoy runners drag markers out of position and the other runners tie up markers, but it’s the in-swinging ball towards the near post/six-yard area, usually targeting a deep runner, that causes the damage. West Brom show movement, thought, and pattern in their set-plays; it’s little wonder they work.